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Abstract
This paper applies the theory of memory for advertising, developed in the consumer
behavior literature, to an industrial organization setting to provide insight into adver-
tising strategies in imperfectly competitive markets. There are two firms and infinitely
many identical consumers. The firms produce a homogeneous product and distribute their
brands through a common retailer. Consumers randomly arrive and are willing to buy
one unit of the product. They are unaware of the existence of a particular brand unless
they remember an ad describing it. Under “retroactive interference” consumers remember
recently seen ads and forget about ads they saw in the past. Under “proactive interfer-
ence” the ability of consumers to recall new ads is hampered by past ad exposure. The
equilibrium of the advertising game is characterized for both proactive and retroactive
interferences across three strategic settings. In the Simultaneous Move setting, the firms’
equilibrium advertising frequencies, remarkably, do not depend on the type of interference.
In the Sequential Move and Dynamic settings, proactive and retroactive interferences do
give rise to different equilibrium outcomes.
JEL Classifications: C73, D11, D43, L13, M37.
Keywords: advertising, memory, forgetting, competitive interference.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, advertising has been studied by two very different subfields of social science,
economics and psychology1. The economic literature on advertising has been concerned with
such important questions as the informational content of ads, the socially optimal level of
advertising, and firm rivalry. The psychology literature has (among other things) dealt with
memory. In this paper, a model is constructed that incorporates economics and psychology
to examine the interplay between advertising and memory with respect to firms’ advertising
decisions.
The branch of economic literature to which the model presented in this paper most closely
concerns is informative advertising in new markets, where consumers are a priori uninformed
about the existence of goods2. In a pioneering study, Butters (1977) investigated the setting in
which firms sell a homogeneous product, and consumers learn about product availability and
prices through advertising. He showed that the resulting equilibrium involves price dispersion,
with high prices advertised more intensively than low prices. More striking was his finding
that free markets produce the socially optimal level of advertising. Stegman (1991) modified
Butters’ model to allow buyers to have heterogeneous reservation values. He showed that each
firm under-advertises in equilibrium. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) examined informative
advertising with spatially differentiated products, finding that the market-determined levels
of advertising are excessive. The current paper takes a very different tack from the extant
literature on informative advertising. Specifically, in this paper a setting is studied in which
consumers occasionally forget about the availability of goods and firms advertise in order to
“remind” them.
The psychology literature on advertising is also vast and rich. Of particular interest from
the perspective of this study are the theories concerning why consumers might forget the
ads they have seen. Most widely known among them are decay theory, interference theory,
1Of course, advertising is one of the primary subjects studied in the field of marketing. Most papers in mar-
keting concerning advertising, however, can be classified as having either economic or psychologic foundations.
2For informative advertising in established markets, where consumers are well informed about availability
and properties of goods, see, for example, Bester and Petrakis (1995), LeBlanc (1998).
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and situational forgetting (Tulving and Pearlston 1966)3. According to the decay theory,
memory traces are formed when a person learns information, and when no longer in use, these
traces gradually fade with the passage of time (Ebbinghaus 1885, Woodworth 1938). The
main argument against this intuitively understandable theory is that it does not account for
processes occurring between initial learning and retrieval.
Alternatively, forgetting may occur because in the limited storage capacity earlier learning
competes, or interferes, with later learning (Jenkins and Dallenbach 1924, Underwood 1957,
Murnane and Shiffrin 1991). The interference theory can work either way. Under proac-
tive interference, earlier learning makes it more difficult to encode new information. Under
retroactive interference, later learning hampers the ability to remember previously learned
information.
Another theory from the information processing approach was introduced by Tulving
(1974), who suggested that people forget certain information because the features of cur-
rent information do not match those they try to retrieve. The theory of situational forgetting
implies that the traces of old information are not lost but require adequate stimulation for
their activation and retrieval.
These theories of forgetting, the competitive interference phenomenon in particular, have
been carried over into consumer behavior literature in analysis of consumer memory for adver-
tising. Burke and Srull (1988) were the first to conduct a series of experiments that examine
interference-induced forgetting in an advertising context. The first experiment tested how
consumer memory for magazine ads is affected by subsequent exposure to competitors’ ads,
finding that recall is significantly diminished by higher level of retroactive interference. The
second experiment examined how the learning of new ads is affected by past ad exposure,
demonstrating that proactive interference has a negative effect on consumer ability to learn
and retain new information presented in future advertising. The third experiment investigated
how consumer memory for a particular ad is affected by the ad’s level of repetition in various
competitive environments. The results suggested that repetition of the same ad only has a
positive effect on recall of the advertised product when there is little or no advertising for
3See Solso (1988) for a textbook review for these theories.
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competitive products. Therefore, higher levels of ad repetition may not overcome detrimental
effects of ad interference4.
In subsequent studies, researchers explored the role of brand familiarity in competitive
advertising. When consumers are exposed to an ad for a familiar and mature brand, the ad
is easily recognized and stored in memory in the well-established schema for the brand. Kent
and Allen (1994) showed experimentally that, in comparison to unfamiliar brands, advertising
information related to familiar brands is less sensitive to competitive interference5.
Summarizing the above, economists have dealt with advertising in competitive markets
without taking into account the role of memory. Psychologists have studied consumer memory
for advertising but not, of course, equilibrium advertising strategies employed by firms. This
paper brings the two together. Its purpose is to construct a model of consumer memory for
advertising, based on the decay and interference theories of forgetting, and to embed this
model in a setting of oligopolistic firm rivalry.
The agents of the model presented in this paper are two firms and infinitely many identical
consumers of total mass one. The firms produce a homogeneous good; firm A produces brand
A and firm B produces brand B. The firms distribute their brands through a common retailer.
Consumers randomly arrive at the retailer and are willing to buy one unit of the good. To
provide a role for advertising, it is assumed that a consumer is unaware of the existence of a
particular brand unless she saw and remember an ad describing it. All the events – arrivals
to the retailer, advertising messages, and forgetting – are Poisson processes.
Consumer memory for advertising is modelled as a continuous-time Markov chain that
takes values in the state space consisting of three elements: “remember an ad describing
brand A”, “remember an ad describing brand B”, and “unaware of the product existence”6.
Initially, all consumers are in state “unaware of the product existence”. A consumer’s memory
jumps to state “remember an ad describing brand A” or “remember an ad describing brand B”
once she sees an advertising message of the respective firm. Suppose the consumer saw firm A’s
4See also Keller (1987, 1991).
5See also Jewell and Unnava (2003), Kumar and Krishnan (2004).
6In Wilson (2002), a decision-maker is also restricted to a finite set of memory states. The paper explores
how the decision-maker with a bounded memory updates her beliefs upon receiving new information, finding
that the agent displays a confirmatory and overconfidence/underconfidence biases.
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ad first. If the consumer subsequently sees firm B’s ad, then, under retroactive interference,
the memory process jumps to state “remember an ad describing brand B”, as new information
facilitates forgetting of what was learned previously. Under proactive interference, the memory
process stays in state “remember an ad describing brand A”, as previous learning hampers
the ability to encode new information. Finally, the consumer may simply forget about the
brand she is aware of, and return to state “unaware of the product existence”, a manifestation
of the decay theory.
The firms set their prices equal to the consumer valuation for the good and compete in
advertising frequencies. The equilibrium outcome of the advertising game is characterized for
both proactive and retroactive interferences across three settings: simultaneous, sequential,
and dynamic moves. In the Simultaneous Move setting, the firms make their advertising deci-
sions simultaneously at the beginning of the game. In this setup, the equilibrium advertising
frequencies, remarkably, do not depend on the type of interference. It is shown that in this
setting each firm over-advertises in equilibrium relative to the social optimum.
In the Sequential Move setting, where one firm makes its advertising decision at the begin-
ning of the game, and the other firm enters the market and chooses its advertising frequency at
some (exogenously given) time T , proactive and retroactive interferences give rise to different
equilibrium outcomes. Results show that, in order to undermine the advertising incentives of
the second firm, the first firm chooses higher advertising frequency under retroactive inter-
ference than under proactive. In the third setting studied, the firms choose their advertising
frequencies twice, at the beginning of the game, and then at time T . As in the Sequential
Move setting, the equilibrium outcome in the Dynamic setting depends on the interference
type. At the beginning of the game, when competing for consumers, the firms choose higher
advertising frequencies under proactive interference than under retroactive interference.
In the next section, the formal model is presented. The Simultaneous Move setting is
analyzed in Section 3. Some technical lemmas are contained in Section 4. In Sections 5 and
6, the Sequential Move and Dynamic settings are explored respectively. Concluding remarks
appear in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
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2 The Model
Supply Side
On the supply side, there are two firms, A and B, that produce a homogeneous product at
zero marginal cost. The firms distribute their brands through a common retailer.
Demand Side
The demand side consists of infinitely many identical consumers of total mass 1. Consumers are
risk-neutral, possess continuous-time discount rate r > 0, and have a sequence of unit demands
for the product. In particular, a consumer receives a gross payoff of v = 1 from consuming
the product whenever she (i) visits the retailer (i.e., goes shopping) and (ii) remembers to buy
the product.
Let Nt denote the number of times a consumer visits the retailer by time t. Nt is a Poisson
process with rate parameter σ > 0. That is,
(i) The number of visits during one time interval is independent of the number of visits during
a different (non-overlapping) time interval;
(ii) In a small time interval ∆t the consumer visits the retailer with probability about σ∆t,
Pr{Nt+∆t = Nt + 1} = σ∆t+ o(∆t).
Here o(∆t) is much smaller than ∆t, i.e.,
lim
∆t→0
o(∆t)
∆t
= 07.
Advertising Technology
To provide the role for advertising, it is assumed that consumers are unaware of the existence
of a particular brand unless they remember an ad describing it. The firms decide on advertising
7For the definition of a Poisson Process see, for example, Doob (1953), pp. 398-404, or Lawler (1995), pp.
53-56.
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frequencies αA and αB – the rate parameters of Poisson processes that advertising messages
follow. Each consumer receives messages independently of other consumers.
The (discounted) cost needed to achieve advertising frequency α ≥ 0 is c(α)/r, where c(·) is
a convex and increasing function, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. The boundary assumptions, c(0) = c′(0) = 0
and limα→∞ c′(α) =∞, guarantee existence of an interior solution.
Consumer Memory for Advertising
Consumer memory for advertising is a continuous-time Markov process Mt taking values in
the state space consisting of three elements: s∅, sA and sB. A consumer remembers an ad
describing brand A (brand B) if her memory is in state sA (state sB). The consumer is
unaware of the product existence if her memory is in state s∅. It follows that consumers never
remember two ads describing each brand at a time. In other words, memory has a limited
storage capacity.
The probability that the memory process in state s∅ jumps to state sA (state sB) in a
small time interval of length ∆t is equal to the probability that the consumer sees firm A’s
(firm B’s) advertising message:
Pr{Mt+∆t = sA|Mt = s∅} = αA∆t+ o(∆t),
Pr{Mt+∆t = sB|Mt = s∅} = αB∆t+ o(∆t).
Conversely, the probability that the process in state sA (state sB) jumps to state s∅ is
proportional to the rate of forgetting φ:
Pr{Mt+∆t = s∅|Mt = sA} = φ∆t+ o(∆t),
Pr{Mt+∆t = s∅|Mt = sB} = φ∆t+ o(∆t).
Parameter φ ≥ 0 reflects the general observation that people forget as time passes (i.e., the
decay theory).
Next, the probability that the process in state sA jumps to state sB is negligibly small
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Figure 1: Transition Diagrams
Proactive Interference Retroactive Interference
sA sB
s∅
0 + o(∆t)
0 + o(∆t)
αA∆t+ o(∆t)
φ∆t+ o(∆t)
αB∆t+ o(∆t)
φ∆t+ o(∆t)
sA sB
s∅
αB∆t+ o(∆t)
αA∆t+ o(∆t)
αA∆t+ o(∆t)
φ∆t+ o(∆t)
αB∆t+ o(∆t)
φ∆t+ o(∆t)
in case of proactive memory: old information hampers the ability to learn new information.
This probability is proportional to αB in case of retroactive memory: new information “pushes
out” old information. That is,
Pr{Mt+∆t = sB|Mt = sA} =
 o(∆t), if memory is proactive,αB∆t+ o(∆t), if memory is retroactive.
Similarly,
Pr{Mt+∆t = sA|Mt = sB} =
 o(∆t), if memory is proactive,αA∆t+ o(∆t), if memory is retroactive.
It is assumed M0 = s∅. That is, at t = 0 consumers are unaware about the existence
of the product. Figure 1 shows graphically the probabilities of transition from one state to
another for the two memory types.
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Equilibrium Concept
There is no price competition between the firms, as, by assumption, consumers never remember
two ads describing each brand at a time. The firms set their prices equal to 1, the consumers’
valuation for the good.
The strategic variables of the firms are advertising frequencies. The equilibrium concept
employed is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the Simultaneous Move setting, the firms
choose their advertising frequencies simultaneously. An equilibrium is a pair (αA, αB).
In the Sequential Move setting, firm A chooses its advertising frequency first; firm B
observes firm A’s frequency, then chooses its own at exogenous time T > 0. In this case, an
equilibrium is a pair (αA, αB(·)).
In the Dynamic setting, the firms choose their advertising frequencies twice: at t = 0, and
then at t = T . Therefore, an equilibrium is a quadruple (αA0, αAT (·, ·); αB0, αBT (·, ·)).
3 Simultaneous Move Setting
In this section the setting in which firm A and firm B make their advertising decisions simul-
taneously at the beginning of the game is analyzed.
Let ps(t) denote the probability that the memory process is in state s at time t:
ps(t) ≡ Pr{Mt = s},
where the dependence on αA and αB is suppressed for the moment.
From the aggregate point of view, psA(t) and psB (t) are the fractions of consumers that at
time t remember ads describing brands A and B respectively, while ps∅(t) is the fraction of
consumers that are unaware of the product existence.
When memory is proactive, functions ps∅(t), psA(t) and psB (t) satisfy the following system
9
of linear differential equations8,

p′s∅ = −(αA + αB)ps∅ + φ(psA + psB ),
p′sA = −φpsA + αAps∅ ,
p′sB = −φpsB + αBps∅ .
The first differential equation corresponds to state s∅. The change in number of consumers
that are unaware of the product existence is on the left hand side of the equation. The
minus term on the right hand side is the rate at which consumers “leave” state s∅, αA + αB,
multiplied by the number of consumers in this state. (A consumer leaves state s∅ when she
observes an ad of firm A or B.) The plus term on the right hand side is the rate at which
consumers “arrive at” state s∅, φ, multiplied by the number of consumers in states sA and
sB. (A consumer arrives at state s∅ from state sA or sB when she forgets about the existence
of brand A or B, respectively.)
The second equation corresponds to state sA. The change in number of consumers that
know about brand A’s existence is on the left hand side of the equation. The minus term on
the right hand side is the rate at which consumers leave state sA, φ, multiplied by the number
of consumers in this state. (A consumer leaves state sA when she forgets about the brand.)
The plus term on the right hand side is the rate at which consumers arrive at state sA, αA,
multiplied by the number of consumers in state s∅. (A consumer arrives at state sA from
state s∅ when she observes an ad of firm A.) Similar logic applies to the third differential
equation that corresponds to state sB.
When memory is retroactive,

p′s∅ = −(αA + αB)ps∅ + φ(psA + psB ),
p′sA = −(αB + φ)psA + αA(psB + ps∅),
p′sB = −(αA + φ)psB + αB(psA + ps∅).
The first differential equation, corresponding to state s∅, coincides with its proactive coun-
8See, for example, Lawler 1995, pp. 56-61.
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terpart. The second and third equations are different. On the left hand side of the second
equation is the change in number of consumers that know about brand A’s existence. The
minus term on the right hand side is the rate at which consumers leave state sA, φ+αB, mul-
tiplied by the number of consumers in this state. (Under retroactive interference, a consumer
leave state sA when she either forget about the brand or when she observes an ad describing
brand B.) The plus term on the right hand side is the rate at which consumers arrive at state
sA, αA, multiplied by the number of consumers in states s∅ and sB. (A consumer arrives at
state sA from state s∅ or sB when she observes an ad message of firm A.) Similar logic applies
to the third differential equation.
It turns out that under initial conditions ps∅(0) = 1, psA(0) = psB (0) = 0 (the process is
in state s∅ at t = 0), the two systems generate the same solution.
Lemma 1. Probabilities ps(t), s = s∅, sA and sB, do not depend on the type of consumer
memory and are given by
ps∅(t;αA, αB) =
φ+ (αA + αB)e−(αA+αB+φ)t
αA + αB + φ
,
psi(t;αA, αB) =
αi
(
1− e−(αA+αB+φ)t)
αA + αB + φ
,
where i = A,B.
Limiting probabilities p¯s ≡ limt→∞ ps(t), s = s∅, sA, sB, represent long-run behavior of
the memory process. It is easy to see that these probabilities are proportional to φ, αA and
αB, respectively:
p¯s∅ =
φ
αA + αB + φ
,
p¯si =
αi
αA + αB + φ
,
where i = A,B.
Lemma 1 allows to compute the (discounted) profits of the firms, as functions of αA and
αB. In a small time period [t, t + ∆t], a consumer buys brand i with probability σ∆t (the
11
probability that she visits the retailer) multiplied by psi(t;αA, αB) (the probability that she
remembers brand i). Firm i’s profit function is, therefore,
Πi(αA, αB) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtpsi(t;αA, αB)σ dt−
c(αi)
r
.
Performing simple algebra yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Profit Functions). In the Simultaneous Move setting, the profit functions of
the firms do not depend on the type of consumer memory and are given by
Πi(αA, αB) =
σαi
r(αA + αB + r + φ)
− c(αi)
r
,
where i = A,B.
In line with economic intuition, the gross profit of firm i (the first term of Πi) is increasing
in its own advertising frequency, decreasing in the advertising frequency of its competitor, and
is proportional to the shopping rate.
Since probabilities ps(t;αA, αB), s = sA, sB, are the same for the two types of consumer
memory, the profit functions are the same. This result is due to symmetry in the initial
conditions – at t = 0 consumers do not know brand A, nor brand B.
Proposition 2 (Over-Advertising in Competitive Equilibrium). In the Simultaneous Move
setting:
(i) The social optimum is α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† is implicitly defined by
σ(r + φ)
(2α† + r + φ)2
= c′(α†).
(ii) Equilibrium is unique and symmetric, α∗A = α
∗
B = α
∗, where α∗ is implicitly defined by
σ(α∗ + r + φ)
(2α∗ + r + φ)2
= c′(α∗).
(iii) Advertising is socially excessive, α∗ > α†.
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While a social planner would aim to increase the fraction of consumers that know about the
product availability through the firms’ advertising messages, each firm cares only about the
fraction of consumers that remember its own brand. As a result, the two firms over-advertise
in equilibrium.
In the simple setting where the firms choose their advertising frequencies simultaneously
at the beginning of the game, the equilibrium outcome is the same independent of whether
consumer memory is proactive or retroactive. However, if some sort of asymmetry is introduced
(for example, one firm enters the market and chooses its advertising frequency first, as in the
Sequential Move setting), or if the firms make their advertising decisions dynamically (the
Dynamic setting), the equilibrium outcome does depend on the type of memory process.
For the rest of the paper φ = 0 is assumed. That is, no direct forgetting occurs. This
assumption greatly simplifies the analysis and makes the difference between proactive and
retroactive interference as stark as possible.
4 Technical Lemmas
Let pmss′(τ) denote the probability that type m memory will be in state s
′ in a time interval of
length τ > 0, given that the process is currently in state s:
pmss′(τ) ≡ Pr{Mt+τ = s′|Mt = s},
where the dependence on αA and αB is suppressed for the moment. This probability is
independent of t, since the memory process has the Markov property.
Lemma 2. (i) Suppose the memory process is currently in state s∅. Then,
pms∅si(τ ;αA, αB) =
αi
(
1− e−(αA+αB)τ)
αA + αB
,
where m = P,R, and i = A,B.
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(ii) Suppose the memory process is currently in state si. Then,
pmsisi(τ ;αA, αB) =
 1, if m = P ,αi+αje−(αA+αB)τ
αA+αB
, if m = R,
pmsisj (τ ;αA, αB) =
 0, if m = P ,αj(1−e−(αA+αB)τ)
αA+αB
, if m = R,
where i, j = A,B, and i 6= j.
This technical lemma deserves some discussion. First, suppose the memory process is
currently in state s∅. Probabilities pms∅sA(τ) and p
m
s∅sB (τ) are obtained by applying φ = 0 to
the formulas of Lemma 1.
Next, suppose the process is in state si, i = A,B. Consider proactive memory: the only
way the process can leave this state is through forgetting, which never happens as φ = 0.
Therefore, for any τ > 0, pmsisi(τ) = 1 and p
m
sisj (τ) = 0.
Consider retroactive memory. It is easy to see that pmsisi(τ) is always greater than the
corresponding long-run probability p¯si , but converges to it as τ → ∞. In contrast, pmsisj (τ)
converges to p¯sj from below.
Define
V mi (αA, αB)|s =
∫ ∞
0
e−rτpmssi(τ ;αA, αB)σ dτ.
In other words, V mi (αA, αB)|s is the gross (i.e., excluding the advertising costs) discounted
profit function of firm i given that the memory process is currently in state s.
Lemma 3. (i) Suppose that the memory process is currently in state s∅. Then,
V mi (αA, αB)|s∅ =
σαi
r(αA + αB + r)
,
where m = P,R, and i = A,B.
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(ii) Suppose that the memory process is currently in state si. Then,
V mi (αA, αB)|si =

σ
r , if m = P ,
σ(αi+r)
r(αA+αB+r)
, if m = R,
V mj (αA, αB)|si =
 0, if m = P ,σαj
r(αA+αB+r)
, if m = R,
where i, j = A,B, and i 6= j.
Consider proactive memory. If the memory process is currently in state si, firm i’s gross
profit is equal to σ/r (maximum possible). The gross profit of its competitor is zero in this
case.
When consumer memory is retroactive, the comparative advantage that firm i has is less
pronounced:
V Ri (αA, αB)|si =
σ(αi + r)
r(αA + αB + r)
<
σ
r
.
5 Sequential Move Setting
In this section the setting in which the firms make their advertising decisions sequentially is
analyzed. Firm A chooses its advertising frequency at the beginning of the game. Firm B
enters the market at some exogenous time T > 0, observes firm A’s advertising decision, and
then chooses its own advertising frequency.
When firm B enters the market, consumers of total mass psA(T ;αA, 0) = 1 − e−αAT
know about brand A, the rest (fraction ps∅(T ;αA, 0) = e
−αAT ) are not aware of the product
existence. Lemmas 1 and 3 allow computation of the firms’ profit functions. For m = P,R,
ΠmA (αA, αB) = V
m
A (αA, 0)|s∅ − e−rT
∑
s=s∅,sA
ps(T ;αA, 0)V mA (αA, 0)|s
+ e−rT
∑
s=s∅,sA
ps(T ;αA, 0)V mA (αA, αB)|s −
c(αA)
r
,
ΠmB (αA, αB) =
∑
s=s∅,sA
ps(T ;αA, 0)V mB (αA, αB)|s −
c(αB)
r
.
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The first two terms of ΠmA constitute the gross discounted profit of firm A before time T .
It is equal to
σαA
r(αA + r)
− e−rT
(
e−αAT
σαA
r(αA + r)
+
(
1− e−αAT )) ,
and is the same for both types of consumer memory.
The third term of ΠmA is the gross profit of firm A from time T on, discounted to t = 0. It
is equal to
e−rT
(
e−αAT
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
+
(
1− e−αAT ))
when memory is proactive, and to
e−rT
(
e−αAT
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
+
(
1− e−αAT ) σ(αA + r)
r(αA + αB + r)
)
when memory is retroactive.
The first term of ΠmB is the gross discounted profit of firm B from time T on, discounted
to t = T . It is equal to
e−αAT
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
when memory is proactive, and to
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
when memory is retroactive.
This serves as a proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Profit Functions). In the Sequential Move setting, the profit functions of the
firms do depend on the type of consumer memory.
(i) When consumer memory is proactive,
ΠPA(αA, αB) =
σαA
r(αA + r)
− c(αA)
r
− e−rT e−αAT σαAαB
r(αA + r)(αA + αB + r)
,
ΠPB(αA, αB) = e
−αAT σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
.
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(ii) When consumer memory is retroactive,
ΠRA(αA, αB) =
σαA
r(αA + r)
− c(αA)
r
− e−rT σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
+ e−rT e−αAT
σαB
(αA + r)(αA + αB + r)
,
ΠRB(αA, αB) =
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
.
It follows that for any given values of αA and αB, firm A’s profit is higher when memory is
proactive than when it is retroactive, while firm B’s profit is higher when memory is retroactive
than when it is proactive. Specifically,
ΠPA(αA, αB)−ΠRA(αA, αB) = e−rT
(
1− e−αAT ) αB
αA + αB + r
,
which is exactly
e−rT
(
ΠRB(αA, αB)−ΠPB(αA, αB)
)
.
This is not a coincidence. Observe that the fraction of consumers that are aware of the product
availability trough the firms’ ads is independent of whether consumer memory is proactive or
retroactive. Therefore, the sum of the firms’ profit functions,
ΠmA (αA, αB) + e
−rTΠmB (αA, αB),
is the same for m = P,R.
Proposition 4 (Firm B’s Strategy). In the Sequential Move setting:
(i) When consumer memory is proactive, firm B’s strategy, αPB(αA), is implicitly defined by
e−αAT
σ(αA + r)(
αA + αPB + r
)2 = c′ (αPB) .
(ii) When consumer memory is retroactive, firm B’s strategy, αRB(αA), is implicitly defined
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by
σ(αA + r)(
αA + αRB + r
)2 = c′ (αRB) .
(iii) For each value of αA, firm B chooses lower advertising frequency when memory is proac-
tive: αPB(αA) < α
R
B(αA).
Firm B has less incentive to invest in advertising when memory is proactive, since at time
T the fraction of its potential customers (i.e., those not already locked up by firm A) is only
e−αAT . When memory is retroactive, by contrast, firm A cannot foreclose any of the market
to firm B because consumers will purchase according to the last ad they observe.
Proposition 5 (Firm A’s Equilibrium Advertising Frequency). In the Sequential Move set-
ting, if T is large enough, firm A chooses higher advertising frequency when consumer memory
is retroactive: αRA > α
P
A.
Sketch of the Proof. First, let T =∞. Firm A maximizes monopoly payoff
Π¯A(αA) ≡ σαA
r(αA + r)
− c(αA)
r
,
which is independent of whether consumer memory is proactive or retroactive. Let α¯A denote
argmaxαA Π¯A(αA).
Next, consider large but finite T . Firm A maximizes
ΠPA
(
αA, α
P
B(αA)
)
= Π¯A(αA) + O
(
e−(r+αA)T
)
when memory is proactive, and
ΠRA
(
αA, α
R
B(αA)
)
= Π¯A(αA) + e−rT
σαRB(αA)
r
(
αA + αRB(αA) + r
) +O(e−(r+αA)T)
when memory is retroactive. Here O
(
e−(r+αA)T
)
is of the same order as e−(r+αA)T . That is,
0 < lim
T→∞
∣∣O (e−(r+αA)T)∣∣
e−(r+αA)T
<∞.
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The marginal effect of increasing advertising frequency from monopoly level α¯A is negligibly
small (of order e−(r+α¯A)T ) when memory is proactive. The effect is sizable when memory is
retroactive. Straightforward algebra (see the Appendix) shows that
dΠRA
(
αA, α
R
B(αA)
)
dαA
∣∣∣∣∣
α¯A
= e−rTH(α¯A) + O
(
e−(r+α¯A)T
)
,
where H(α¯A) > 0. It follows that in equilibrium firm A chooses higher advertising frequency
when memory is retroactive.
6 Dynamic Setting
In this section, the setting in which the firms choose their advertising frequencies twice, at
t = 0 and at t = T , is analyzed.
Let αA0 and αB0 denote the firms’ advertising frequencies chosen at time 0; αAT and αBT
denote the frequencies chosen at time T . Lemmas 1 and 3 allow computation of the firms’
profit functions.
Πmi = V
m
i (αA0, αB0)|s∅ − e−rT
∑
s=s∅,sA,sB
ps(T ;αA0, αB0)V mi (αA0, αB0)|s
− (1− e−rT ) c(αA0)
r
+ e−rTΠmiT (αA0, αB0, αAT , αBT ),
where m = P,R, and i = A,B.
The first two terms constitute the gross discounted profit of firm i from t = 0 to T . It is
equal to
σαi0
r(αA0 + αB0 + r)
− e−rT
(
σαi0e
−(αA0+αB0)T
r(αA0 + αB0 + r)
+
σαi0
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T )
r(αA0 + αB0)
)
,
and is the same for both types of consumer memory. The last term, e−rTΠmiT , is firm i’s profit
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from time T on, discounted to t = 0.
ΠPiT =
∑
s=s∅,sA,sB
ps(T ;αA0, αB0)V Pi (αAT , αBT )|s −
c(αAT )
r
=
σαiT e
−(αA0+αB0)T
r(αAT + αBT + r)
+
σαi0
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T )
r(αA0 + αB0)
− c(αiT )
r
,
ΠRiT =
σαiT e
−(αA0+αB0)T
r(αAT + αBT + r)
+
σ(αiT + r)αi0
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T )
r(αAT + αBT + r)(αA0 + αB0)
+
σαiTαj0
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T )
r(αAT + αBT + r)(αA0 + αB0)
− c(αiT )
r
.
This serves as a proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Profit Functions). In the Dynamic setting, the profit functions of the firms
do depend on the type of consumer memory.
(i) When consumer memory is proactive,
ΠPi =
σαi0
r(αA0 + αB0 + r)
− (1− e−rT ) c(αi0)
r
− e−rT c(αiT )
r
−e−rT e−(αA0+αB0)T
(
αi0
αA0 + αB0 + r
− αiT
αAT + αBT + r
))
where i = A,B.
(ii) When consumer memory is retroactive,
ΠRi = Π
P
i − e−rT
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T
) σ(αi0αjT − αj0αiT )
r(αAT + αBT + r)(αA0 + αB0)
,
where i, j = A,B, and i 6= j.
It follows that firm i’s profit is higher when memory is proactive if and only if
αi0αjT − αj0αiT > 0,
or
αi0/αj0 > αiT /αjT .
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This is very intuitive. Fix αiT and αjT for a moment. If αi0 is high relative to αj0 and memory
is proactive, then, from time T on, firm i gets most of its profit from selling the product to
large fraction pi(T ;αA0, αB0) of consumers (having received an ad describing firm i’s product,
these consumers will never switch to brand j).
If αi0 is low relative to αj0, then firm i gets higher profit when memory is retroactive, since
even consumers that are aware of brand j at time T (fraction pj(T ;αA0, αB0), which is large
in this case) are among its potential buyers.
Also, observe that the sum of the firms’ profit functions,
ΠmA (αA, αB) + e
−rTΠmB (αA, αB),
is the same for m = P,R (at any point in time, the fraction of consumers that know about
the product is independent of whether consumer memory is proactive or retroactive).
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium Strategies at t = T ). In the Dynamic setting:
(i) When consumer memory is proactive, the firms’ equilibrium strategies at time T , αPAT (αA0, αB0)
and αPBT (αA0, αB0), are implicitly defined by the system of equations
e−(αA0+αB0)T σ(α
P
BT+r)
(αPAT+αPBT+r)
2 = c′
(
αPAT
)
,
e−(αA0+αB0)T σ(α
P
AT+r)
(αPAT+αPBT+r)
2 = c′
(
αPBT
)
.
(ii) When consumer memory is retroactive, the firms’ equilibrium strategies at time T , αRAT (αA0, αB0)
and αRBT (αA0, αB0), are implicitly defined by the system of equations
σ((αA0+αB0)αRBT+e−(αA0+αB0)TαA0r+αB0r)
(αA0+αB0)(α
R
AT+α
R
BT+r)
2 = c′
(
αRAT
)
,
σ((αA0+αB0)αRAT+e−(αA0+αB0)TαB0r+αA0r)
(αA0+αB0)(α
R
AT+α
R
BT+r)
2 = c′
(
αRBT
)
.
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium Strategies at t = 0). In the Dynamic setting, if T is large
enough, the firms choose higher advertising frequencies when consumer memory is proactive:
αPA0 = α
P
B0 > α
R
A0 = α
R
B0.
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Note that in the limit as T →∞ the Dynamic setting converges to the Simultaneous Move
setting, in which case advertising frequencies chosen by the firms at t = 0 do not depend on
the type of memory.
Sketch of the Proof. Consider large but finite T . Incorporating time T strategies into the
profit functions yields
ΠPi =
σαi0
r(αA0 + αB0 + r)
− (1− e−rT ) c(αi0)
r
− e−rT c
(
αPiT
)
r
+O
(
e−(αA0+αB0+r)T
)
when memory is proactive, and
ΠRi =
σαi0
r(αA0 + αB0 + r)
− (1− e−rT ) c(αi0)
r
− e−rT c
(
αRiT
)
r
− e−rT
σ
(
αi0α
R
jT − αj0αRiT
)
r(αA0 + αB0)
(
αRAT + α
R
BT + r
) +O(e−(αA0+αB0+r)T)
when memory is retroactive. In the symmetric equilibrium the firms choose advertising fre-
quencies αmA0 = α
m
B0 = α
m
0 , where α
m
0 satisfies
dΠmi
dαi0
∣∣∣∣
αi0=αj0=αm0
≡
(
∂Πmi
∂αi0
+
∂Πmi
∂αmiT
dαmiT
dαi0
+
∂Πmi
∂αmjT
dαmjT
dαi0
)∣∣∣∣∣
αi0=αj0=αm0
= 0.
The second term in brackets is zero, as αmiT is chosen optimally. Performing simple but, in the
case of retroactive memory, tedious algebra yields the following equations for αP0 and α
R
0 :
σ
(
αP0 + r
)(
2αP0 + r
)2 − (1− e−rT ) c′(αP0 ) + O(e−(2αP0+r)T) = 0
and
σ
(
αR0 + r
)(
2αR0 + r
)2 − (1− e−rT ) c′ (αR0 )− e−rTG (αR0 )+O(e−(2αR0 +r)T) = 0,
where G(αR0 ) > 0 (see the Appendix). It follows that in equilibrium the firms choose higher
advertising frequencies when memory is proactive: αP0 > α
R
0 .
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7 Conclusion
This paper has applied the theories of proactive and retroactive interference developed in the
psychology literature to explore how consumer memory affects advertising competition be-
tween firms. The equilibrium advertising frequencies were characterized under three different
strategic settings: simultaneous, sequential, and dynamic moves.
It was shown that when firms choose their advertising frequencies simultaneously, the equi-
librium outcome remarkably does not depend on whether memory corresponds to proactive or
retroactive interference. The equilibrium outcome in this setting exhibits excessive advertising
due to a type of brand-stealing effect.
In the Sequential Move and Dynamic settings, proactive interference was shown to have
similar competitive effects as consumer switching costs9. Indeed, under proactive interference
a consumer remembers the brand that was first to capture her attention through an adver-
tisement. Moreover, this exposure hampers her ability to learn subsequently about competing
brands. In the Sequential Move setting, the second firm chooses lower advertising frequency
when memory is proactive than when it is retroactive, since by the time it enters the market,
many consumers have already been locked up by the first firm. In the Dynamic setting, the
firms compete for consumers very aggressively at the beginning of the game when memory is
proactive. By the time the firms reconsider their advertising strategies, the fraction of con-
sumers that have not been locked up is small, and the firms consequently choose relatively
low levels of advertising for the rest of the game.
It was assumed that consumers could never remember more than a single brand at a time
which implied no scope for price competition. Specifically, each firm charges the monopoly
price to the consumers who remember its ad. A natural extension of the model would be
to introduce additional memory registers and firms. For instance, suppose there were three
firms and consumers could remember two brands. Then, the firms would compete not only in
advertising, but also in prices. Another important extension would be to introduce a role for
brand familiarity. (Familiar brands are less sensitive to interference effects.) This could be
9On switching costs see, for example, Klemperer’s (1987) pioneering article and his subsequent (1995) survey.
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modelled by supposing that consumers were more likely to remember brands that they had
used in the past.
The study of the economic consequences of bounded memory is still in its infancy10. This
paper has made a first attempt at understanding how the limited memory of consumers might
impact the advertising strategies of firms. While several important themes emerged from this
investigation, there are clearly many avenues for future research in which the insights gleaned
here may be refined and extended.
10See, for example, Wilson (2002), Mullainathan (2002), and Kra¨hmer (2004).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
For i = A,B,
Πi(αA, αB) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtpsi(t;αA, αB)σ dt−
c(αi)
r
=
σαi
αA + αB + φ
∫ ∞
0
(
e−rt − e−(αA+αB+r+φ)t
)
dt− c(αi)
r
=
σαi
αA + αB + φ
(
1
r
− 1
αA + αB + r + φ
)
− c(αi)
r
=
σαi
r(αA + αB + r + φ)
− c(αi)
r
.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Social planner solves
max
αA,αB
ΠA(αA, αB) + ΠB(αA, αB),
or
max
αA,αB
σ(αA + αB)
r(αA + αB + r + φ)
− c(αA)
r
− c(αB)
r
,
F.O.C.:

σ(r+φ)
(αA+αB+r+φ)2
= c′(αA),
σ(r+φ)
(αA+αB+r+φ)2
= c′(αB).
It is easy to show that the matrix of second derivatives
 − 2σ(r+φ)r(αA+αB+r+φ)3 − c′′(αA)r − 2σ(r+φ)r(αA+αB+r+φ)3
− 2σ(r+φ)
r(αA+αB+r+φ)3
− 2σ(r+φ)
r(αA+αB+r+φ)3
− c′′(αB)r

is negative semidefinite, which implies sufficiency of the first-order conditions. Therefore,
α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† satisfies
σ(r + φ)
(2α† + r + φ)2
= c′(α†).
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(ii) Firm A’s best-response function BRA(αB) is a solution to
max
αA
ΠA(αA, αB),
or
max
αA
σαA
r(αA + αB + r + φ)
− c(αA)
r
,
F.O.C.:
σ(αB + r + φ)
(αA + αB + r + φ)2
= c′(αA).
As
∂2
∂α2A
Π(αA, αB) =
−2σ(αB + r + φ)
r(αA + αB + r + φ)3
− c
′′(αA)
r
< 0,
the first-order conditions are sufficient. Similarly, BRB(αA) can be found from
σ(αA + r + φ)
(αA + αB + r + φ)2
= c′(αB).
A solution to 
σ(αB+r+φ)
(αA+αB+r+φ)2
= c′(αA),
σ(αA+r+φ)
(αA+αB+r+φ)2
= c′(αB).
yields equilibrium advertising frequencies. Uniqueness and symmetry of the solution is
shown in two steps.
From the system above, it follows
(αA + r + φ)c′(αA) = (αB + r + φ)c′(αB).
The LHS (RHS) is increasing in αA (αB). This observation implies the solution is
symmetric, α∗A = α
∗
B = α
∗, where α∗ satisfies
σ(α∗ + r + φ)
(2α∗ + r + φ)2
= c′(α∗).
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Second,
BR′A(αB) =
2σ(αA − αB − r − φ)
2σ(αB + r + φ) + (αA + αB + r + φ)3c′′(αA)
,
BR′B(αA) =
2σ(αB − αA − r − φ)
2σ(αA + r + φ) + (αA + αB + r + φ)3c′′(αB)
.
Observe that BR′A(αB)|αA=αB and BR′B(αA)|αA=αB < 0. Therefore, the solution is
unique.
(iii) The LHS’s of the equations that define α† and α∗,
(2α† + r + φ)2c′(α†) = σ(r + φ)
and
(2α∗ + r + φ)2c′(α∗) = σ(α∗ + r + φ),
are increasing functions of α† and α∗, respectively. This observation implies α∗ > α†.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) See Lemma 1.
(ii) When memory is proactive, pPsisi(τ) = 1, p
P
sisj (τ) = 0. When memory is retroactive, prob-
abilities pRsisA(τ) and p
R
sisA
(τ) satisfy the following system of linear differential equations:

d
dτ p
R
sisA
= −αBpRsisA + αApRsisB ,
d
dτ p
R
sisB
= −αApRsisB + αBpRsisA ,
with initial conditions pRsisi(0) = 1, p
R
sisj (0) = 0.
The derivation will appear in the next draft of this paper.
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Proof of Lemma 3.
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) For i = A,B,
V mi (αA, αB)|s∅ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rτpms∅si(αA, αB)σ dτ
=
σαi
αA + αB
∫ ∞
0
(
e−rτ − e−(αA+αB+r)τ
)
dτ
=
σαi
αA + αB
(
1
r
− 1
αA + αB + r
)
=
σαi
r(αA + αB + r)
.
(ii) When memory is proactive, V Pi (αA, αB)|si = σ/r and V Pj (αA, αB)|si = 0. When memory
is retroactive,
V Ri (αA, αB)|si =
∫ ∞
0
e−rτpRsisi(αA, αB)σ dτ
=
σ
αA + αB
∫ ∞
0
(
αie
−rτ + αje−(αA+αB+r)τ
)
dτ
=
σ
αA + αB
(
αi
r
+
αj
αA + αB + r
)
=
σ(αi + r)
r(αA + αB + r)
,
V mj (αA, αB)|si =
∫ ∞
0
e−rτpRsisj (αA, αB)σ dτ
=
σαj
αA + αB
∫ ∞
0
(
e−rτ − e−(αA+αB+r)t
)
dτ
=
σαj
αA + αB
(
1
r
− 1
αA + αB + r
)
=
σαj
r(αA + αB + r)
.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) When memory is proactive, firm B solves
max
αB
ΠPB(αA, αB),
or
max
αB
e−αAT
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
,
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F.O.C.: e−αAT
σ(αA + r)(
αA + αPB + r
)2 = c′ (αPB) .
As
∂2
∂α2B
ΠmB (αA, αB) = − e−αAT
2σ(αA + r)
r
(
αA + αPB + r
)3 − c′′
(
αPB
)
r
< 0,
the first-order conditions for αPB(αA) are sufficient.
(ii) Similarly, αRB(αA) is a solution to
σ(αA + r)(
αA + αRB + r
)2 = c′ (αRB) .
(iii) Rewrite the first-order conditions for αPB and α
R
B as
(
αA + αPB + r
)2
c′
(
αPB
)
= e−αATσ(αA + r)
and (
αA + αRB + r
)2
c′
(
αRB
)
= σ(αA + r).
The LHS’s of the above equations are increasing functions of αPB and α
R
B, respectively.
This observation implies αPB(αA) < α
R
B(αA), for each value of αA.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Consider large but finite T . Evaluating ddαAΠ
m
A (αA, α
m
B (αA)) at α¯A yields
dΠPA
dαA
∣∣∣∣
α¯A
= O
(
e−(r+α¯A)T
)
and
dΠRA
dαA
∣∣∣∣
α¯A
= e−rT
(
σαRB(α¯A)
r
(
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)2
− σ(α¯A + r)
r
(
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)2 dαRB(α¯A)dα¯A
)
+O
(
e−(r+α¯A)T
)
.
29
Applying the Implicit function theorem to equation (ii) of Proposition 4 yields
dαRB(α¯A)
dα¯A
= − α¯A + r − α
R
B(α¯A)
2(α¯A + r) + h(α¯A)
,
where
h(α¯A) ≡ 1
σ
c′′
(
αRB(α¯A)
) (
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)3
> 0.
Thus,
dΠRA
dαA
∣∣∣∣
α¯A
= e−rT
(
σαRB(α¯A)
r
(
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)2
+
σ(α¯A + r)
(
α¯A + r − αRB(α¯A)
)
r
(
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)2 (2(α¯A + r) + h(α¯A))
)
+O
(
e−(r+α¯A)T
)
= e−rT
(α¯A + r)
(
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)
+ αRB(α¯A)h(α¯A)
r
(
α¯A + αRB(α¯A) + r
)2 (2(α¯A + r) + h(α¯A)) + O
(
e−(r+α¯A)T
)
.
It follows from the above that
dΠRA
dαA
∣∣∣∣
α¯A
>
dΠPA
dαA
∣∣∣∣
α¯A
.
Therefore, firm A chooses higher advertising frequency when memory is retroactive.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Consider proactive memory, t = T . Firm i’s best-response function is a solution to
max
αiT
ΠPiT (αA0, αB0, αB0, αBT ),
F.O.C.: e−(αA0+αB0)T
σ(αjT + r)
(αAT + αBT + r)2
= c′(αAT ).
As
∂2
∂α2iT
ΠPiT = −e−(αA0+αB0)T
2σ(αjT + r)
r(αAT + αBT + r)3
− c
′′(αAT )
r
< 0,
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the first-order conditions are sufficient. A solution to
e−(αA0+αB0)T σ(α
P
BT+r)
(αPAT+αPBT+r)
2 = c′
(
αPAT
)
,
e−(αA0+αB0)T σ(α
P
AT+r)
(αPAT+αPBT+r)
2 = c′
(
αPBT
)
.
yields time T equilibrium strategies, αPAT (αA0, αB0) and α
P
BT (αA0, αB0).
(ii) Consider retroactive memory, t = T . Firm i’s best-response function is a solution to
max
αiT
ΠRiT (αA0, αB0, αB0, αBT ),
F.O.C.:
σ(αjT + r)e−(αA0+αB0)T
(αAT + αBT + r)2
+
σαjTαi0
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T )
(αAT + αBT + r)2(αA0 + αB0)
+
σ(αjT + r)αj0
(
1− e−(αA0+αB0)T )
(αAT + αBT + r)2(αA0 + αB0)
= c′(αAT ).
As ∂2ΠRiT /∂α
2
AT < 0, the first-order conditions are sufficient. A solution to
σ((αA0+αB0)αRBT+e−(αA0+αB0)TαA0r+αB0r)
(αA0+αB0)(α
R
AT+α
R
BT+r)
2 = c′
(
αRAT
)
,
σ((αA0+αB0)αRAT+e−(αA0+αB0)TαB0r+αA0r)
(αA0+αB0)(α
R
AT+α
R
BT+r)
2 = c′
(
αRBT
)
.
yields time T equilibrium strategies, αRAT (αA0, αB0) and α
R
BT (αA0, αB0).
Proof of Proposition 8.
Differentiating the system of equations that jointly defines αRAT and α
R
BT (part (ii) of Propo-
sition 7) with respect to αi0 yields
dαRjT
dαi0
∣∣∣∣∣
αi0=αj0=α0
=
rc′
(
αRT
)
2
(
2α0c′
(
αRT
)
+
(
2α0αRT + α0r
)
c′′
(
αRT
)) +O (e−2α0T) ,
where αRT ≡ αRAT (α0, α0) = αRBT (α0, α0) .
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Next,
dΠRi
dαi0
∣∣∣∣
αi0=αj0=α0
=
σ (α0 + r)
r (2α0 + r)
2 −
(
1− e−rT ) c′ (α0)
r
− e−rT
 σαRT
2rα0
(
2αRT + r
) + σ
2r
(
2αRT + r
) dαRjT
dαi0
∣∣∣∣∣
αi0=αj0=α0

+O
(
e−(2α0+r)T
)
.
So, αR0 is defined by the following equation:
σ
(
αR0 + r
)(
2αR0 + r
)2 − (1− e−rT ) c′ (αR0 )− e−rTG (αR0 )+O(e−(2αR0 +r)T) = 0,
where
G(αR0 ) ≡
σαRT
2αR0
(
2αRT + r
) + σ
2
(
2αRT + r
) dαRjT
dαi0
∣∣∣∣∣
αi0=αj0=αR0
> 0.
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